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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses contrasting academic understandings of ‘equilibrium resilience’ and 
‘evolutionary resilience’ and investigates how these nuances are reflected within both policy 
and practice. We reveal that there is a lack of clarity in policy, where these differences are not 
acknowledged with resilience mainly discussed as a singular, vague, but optimistic aim. This 
opaque political treatment of the term and the lack of guidance has affected practice by 
privileging an equilibrist interpretation over more transformative, evolutionary measures. In 
short, resilience within spatial planning is characterised by a simple return to normality that is 
more analogous with planning norms, engineered responses, dominant interests, and techno- 
managerial trends. The paper argues that, although presented as a possible paradigm shift, 
resilience policy and practice underpin existing behaviour and normalise risk. It leaves 
unaddressed wider sociocultural concerns and instead emerges as a narrow, regressive, techno-
rational frame centred on reactive measures at the building scale. 
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Introduction 
‘Resilience’ has been rapidly appropriated and cascaded through many public and social policy 
initiatives, emerging as a common reference point in the vocabulary of politicians and policy-
makers alike. Similarly, academic interest has arisen across a range of seemingly disparate 
disciplines, reflecting not only its broad rhetorical and intellectual appeal, but also how the 
concept has become ripe for theoretical interrogation and practical analysis. Given its 
widespread requisition throughout the political arena and its related influence upon people and 
places the concept warrants thorough deconstruction and analysis from a spatial planning 
perspective.  
 
Superficially ‘resilience’ is an undoubtedly agreeable ‘motherhood and apple-pie’ notion. To 
argue that society, the economy, cities or infrastructure should be less resilient is illogical, akin 
to a planner suggesting that development should be ‘unsustainable’ or a politician arguing 
against ‘progress’. This servile acceptability and burgeoning normalisation has proven 
instrumental to its rapid incorporation into the contemporary lexicon of academics and policy 
makers. Resilience instinctively appears incontestable, portraying a desirable, aspirational goal 
relevant to practically any given issue. The development of the concept has also laden resilience 
with multiple meanings providing considerable scope for interpretation (Brand and Jax, 2007) 
and widening its potential application. This pliable, and essentially optimistic character of 
resilience, has aided its transferability whilst arguably facilitating an initial resistance to 
critique, particularly from the political sphere where the concept has rapidly gained currency 
in recent years. However, this lack of normative contention should not immunise the concept 
from being uncritically unpacked, automatically promoted or unthinkingly employed.  
 
A number of conceptual nuances associated with resilience have been explored in academic 
literature. Recent editions of Planning Theory & Practice, the Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, and Planning Practice and Research collated a series of reflections on 
the theme of resilience and how it has provided a context for a broad range of inter-related 
administrative programmes. Urging a ‘cautionary note’ with regard to current frames of 
reference for the term (Porter and Davoudi, 2012), and citing the ‘contested’ nature of the 
concept (O’Hare and White, forthcoming), such collections acknowledge that resilience has 
both regressive and progressive potentialities.  
 
Several analyses express optimism regarding the transformative capacity of certain forms of 
resilience. For example, Davoudi (2012a) has been careful not to dismiss the qualities of 
framing devices such as resilience, whilst the work of Amin (2013), though acknowledging the 
neoliberal undertones of many articulations of resilience and preparedness, has similarly drawn 
attention toward competing interpretations of anticipatory regimes more closely aligned with 
social democratic principles (namely in Sweden). These, and similar accounts (Yamane, 2009), 
stress that strategies of resilience are not necessarily pre-disposed to merely bounce-back to a 
pre-shock normality, and that they are not pre-determined to privilege the status-quo and 
underwrite asymmetric social and economic circumstances.  
 
Yet despite optimism from some quarters, it is clear that the rapid political ascent of the term 
raises important questions concerning how resilience is understood, what it is designed to 
achieve and how this may translate into practice. This has become all the more pertinent given 
how resilience has emerged both as a backdrop onto which broader societal values and norms 
have been projected, and more specifically as a policy foci with the potential to influence spatial 
forms and social processes. Moreover, it is suggested that it has naturalistic strains that 
‘demand acquiescence’ (Neocleous, 2013: 7) creating an ideological trope that argues for the 
citizen to merely adapt to the normal demands of capital and the state, rather than via more 
transformative measures. As Gleeson (2012: 938) explains, uncritical urban determinism such 
as this “leads ineluctably to prescriptions, including policy, that deny and thus mask the play 
of social power”. It is within this context that this research is situated. 
 
Much of this important emerging critique examines conceptual nuances (Davoudi 2012a), 
spatial locations (Amin 2013), sectoral issues (Bristow 2012) or thematic investigations 
(Funfgeld and McEvoy 2012) - all of which are helping to provide clarity to a slippery concept. 
This paper differs from previous studies by conducting a broad meta-analysis of resilience 
policy from different sectors to examine how resilience is understood by policy-makers and 
practitioners and how the different resilience discourses shape and influence planning practice. 
This empirical approach provides a wider, more encompassing perspective than has been 
provided so far and enabling conclusions to be drawn about the relationship between the 
concept and spatial planning policy and practice more generally. 
 
An analysis was conducted of policy transecting a number of interests related to spatial 
planning. The policy review consisted of key pieces of UK legislation and policy with a 
selected survey of European legislation and local authority guidance. The work took place 
during April 2012, and so includes policy documents to that date and only those that had been 
uploaded to the website by the webmaster (this can sometimes be variable). UK legislation is 
predominantly contained on the UK Official Documents website 
(www.officialdocuments.gov.uk), which houses Command Papers, Select Committee Inquiry 
reports, Departmental annual reports and Departmental reviews. The search term was 
‘resilien*’ (to include resilience; resilient and resiliently) was used as a search term with the 
filter 2005 to the present. In total, 823 documents were found to contain the word resilience or 
a variation in it. These were filtered to include those that were related to planning or 
environmental management particularly those around land use and defence, water management 
and climate change adaptation. Where documents were duplicated (for example, if a bill went 
through a number of revisions) the final piece of legislation on the statute books was looked at. 
Each document was downloaded and a search performed to look for words relating to 
“resilience”, “resilient”, “recovery”, “preparation”, “adaptation”, “adapt”, “adaptive”, 
“capability” and “capacity”. This resulted in 28 documents that made an attempt to define the 
term “resilience” or its associated terms. The Cabinet Office website provides guidance on key 
European or sub-national documents and six of these were selected including Preparing 
Scotland (Scottish Executive 2007) and EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth (European Commission 2010). The resulting 34 documents were considered 
to be a large enough sample from which to explore how resilience is understood by policy 
makers and to explore the implications for practice.  
 
This paper studies the concept of resilience: examining its interpretation; reviewing its 
infiltration into policy; and analysing its potential impact upon spatial planning. Utilising an 
extensive literature and policy review and reflecting upon the authors’ research into resilience 
from urban and environmental perspectives, the paper provides a timely evaluation of the 
spatial planning implications of the concept. The article compares the pioneering work of 
Holling (1973) and his two interpretations of resilience: ‘engineering’ and ‘ecological’ both of 
which are based on a return to equilibrium (Simmie and Martin, 2010), with more 
contemporary discussions of ‘evolutionary’ resilience which is concerned with more 
transformative adaptation (Davoudi, 2012a). It uses these contrasting interpretations as an 
analytical frame to better comprehend how resilience theory becomes manifest in policy and 
practice. The article highlights that for resilience to enjoy utility and longevity, fundamental 
issues connected with its contested conceptual understanding, variable political positioning and 
resultant application need to be addressed. To discuss these points the paper is structured 
around three critical questions: which resilience (how is it interpreted?); why resilience (what 
is the desired policy focus?); and whose resilience (who gains or is privileged?). 
 
Which resilience: to Rebound or Change? 
To appreciate the intricacies of resilience attention should first turn to the concept’s genus and 
germination. The term’s origins can be traced to ecology and natural science (Walker and 
Cooper, 2011), but resilience has since been adopted by a multitude of broader disciplines, 
from psychology and psychiatry (Kaplan, 1999) to social and community development (Adger, 
2000) to engineering and design (Bosher, 2008). Within spatial planning resilience has been 
most commonly discussed as a normative concept to build capacity to manage specific risks, 
including climate change (Communities and Local Government (CLG), 2007a), terrorism 
(Coaffee and O’Hare, 2008), flooding and drought (White, 2010), and economic and regional 
decline (Hudson, 2010). Therefore, from relatively discrete beginnings resilience now has 
potentially profound implications for the theory and practice of spatial planning. 
 
In his influential 1973 paper, Holling distinguished between two notions of resilience. The first 
was ‘engineering resilience’, developed from economics, mathematics and physics, which 
referred to the ability of an ecosystem to return to stability or equilibrium after a disturbance 
(Holling, 1973; Pickett et al., 2004). Holling also argued that there could also be an ‘ecological 
resilience’ concerning the ability to absorb shocks ‘and still persist’ (1973: 17). He states that 
these are essentially two contrasting aspects of ‘stability’ with engineering resilience concerned 
with maintaining efficiency of function whilst ecological resilience relates to maintaining the 
existence of function (Holling, 1996: 33). Davoudi (2012a: 301) explain the nuances further 
outlining: “what underpins both perspectives is the belief in the existence of equilibrium in 
systems, be it a pre-existing one to which a resilient system bounces back (engineering) or a 
new one to which it bounces forth (ecological)”. 
 
More recently, notions of evolutionary resilience have added to this discourse. This 
understanding argues against the desirability of a return to equilibrium or an increase in the 
ability to cope with disturbance and instead advocates a new form and function better equipped 
to accommodate shocks or stresses (Simmie and Martin, 2010). Here the more evolutionary 
notion of the need for systemic adaptation to changing normalities is emphasised with the 
heterogeneous links between social and ecological systems highlighted. This development 
helped transform the concept into one with wider desirability, having synergies with the 
uncertain nature of contemporary ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) and concerns 
regarding the efficacy of traditional techno-scientific managerial approaches to address ‘post-
normal’ threats (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991) where ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, 
stakes high and decisions urgent’ (Ravetz, 2004: 249). This more holistic, precautionary 
interpretation focused on engendering system enhancement (see Shaw and Theobald, 2011) 
has helped underwrite its cross-pollination with integrative properties drawing connections 
between ecological, physical and social systems proving attractive (Berkes and Folke, 1998; 
Godschalk, 2003). 
 
Although abstractions of resilience may be translated into the policy arena in a separate manner 
they can also be utilised in tandem where, for example, a system can recover quickly from a 
short-term impact and facilitate a longer-term transition to a state less vulnerable to 
experiencing such shocks in the first instance. This more complex linking of social-ecological 
systems provides a useful theoretical frame for problem-setting and problem solving 
(Wilkinson, 2011). However, as this article will argue, its impact on practice is hampered by 
fragmentary pressures and opaque definitions. 
 
Distinguishing between normative interpretations of equilibrist and evolutionary resilience (or 
alternatively ascertaining which resilience) is essential to understanding the challenges of 
policy integration as, critically, they have contrasting aims and outcomes. Equilibrist 
interpretations are both simplistic and fatalistic; accepting the status quo, leaving unchallenged 
current norms of behaviour that drive risky behaviour and privileging reactive responses to 
risk. They are synergous with technocratic or engineering-led approaches that aspire to increase 
the ability to withstand shocks or ‘bounce back’ and under extreme circumstances can help 
create cities where, for example, ‘form follows fear’ (Ellin, 1997) with architecture, design and 
planning dominated by nervousness and paranoia (Flusty, 1994).  
 
Conversely, evolutionary interpretations are perceived as process dominated, in which 
resilience is considered a broader, more endemic and deliberative practice whereby, for 
example, the adaptive capacity of cities or communities can be augmented with an emphasis 
on behavioural or institutional change alongside recovery (Kaplan, 1999; Manyena, 2006). 
Ecological interpretations hold synergy with the term ‘proactive resilience’ (Dovers and 
Handmer, 1992) and tend to be progressive and dynamic, challenging existing practices and 
aspiring for a new normality; one better equipped to avoid shocks. Table one summarises the 
contrasting aims of the two differing understandings of resilience, highlighting the criticality 
of framing which resilience is pertinent within spatial planning; one advocates a preservationist, 
stable approach, whilst the other pursues a more evolutionary and flexible agenda. 
  
 
Equilibrium Resilience Evolutionary Resilience 
Aim 
Equilibrist 
Existing normality 
Preserve  
Stability  
Adaptive 
New normality  
Transform 
Flexibility 
 
Table one: the contrasting aims of equilibrist and evolutionary resilience. 
 
Whilst distinctions between differing conceptual understandings may be well recognised in 
academic spheres (Brand and Jax, 2007; Davoudi 2012a; Folke, 2006), in a highly connected 
and globalised world these nuances must be reflected beyond science to the governance 
professions. Therefore a central message of this section is that when the concept is used, 
whether by politicians, policy makers or planners, there is a need for clarity regarding which 
understanding is referred to, and from there to why resilience is perceived to be a desirable 
policy outcome. It is this issue that the paper addresses next. 
Why Resilience: Atomised or Abstract? 
Society must, we are implored, become more resilient to unexpected events (Cabinet Office, 
2008). The past decade has seen resilience be infused throughout policy Furedi (2008) with, 
for example, the Scottish Executive (2007: 1) stating that ‘central government’s approach to 
civil contingency planning is built around the concept of resilience’. This section is designed 
to build upon the analysis thus far by examining the policy areas where resilience has been 
engaged with and investigating how it has been interpreted. This will illuminate both the 
political utility of the concept and how equilibrist and evolutionary interpretations frame 
distinctive policy agendas. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given its slippery nature, it is commonplace for resilience to be used in 
a generic and aspirational manner. For example, when discussing infrastructure it is vaguely 
stated that: ‘because risks change over time it is necessary to re-evaluate risk and to modify 
resilience strategies continually’ (Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology, 2010: 2). 
Where more guidance is provided it is significant that there is a strong bias towards the 
equilibrist interpretation of resilience; rebound and recovery are at the cornerstone of policies 
connected with emergency response (CLG, 2008), business (Home Office, 2003), terrorism 
(HM Government, 2008), defence (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2009), 
infrastructure (Cabinet Office, 2010), transport (Department for Transport, DECC and Defra, 
2011) and climate change (HM Government, 2011a).  
 
For instance, HM Treasury and Defra (2009: 9) suggest that we should: ‘design the activity to 
tolerate a wider range of climate conditions, while retaining the same basic structure and 
functioning. For example, by building a bridge higher than otherwise would be done’. 
Moreover, even where policy appears to discuss resilience in a holistic manner this is usually 
from a rather narrow engineering interpretation, such as: ‘Physical protection may make up an 
important part of resilience, but it is not the only factor. Resilience is also underpinned by good 
design of infrastructure networks, effective emergency response, business continuity planning, 
and recovery arrangements’ (Cabinet Office, 2011a: 5). By comparison evolutionary 
interpretations of resilience are present to a much lesser extent and are mainly centred on 
climate change responses beyond hard infrastructure, such as through the provision of green 
infrastructure (HM Government, 2011b).  
 With regard to planning, the discipline has also witnessed a gradual infiltration of resilience 
discourse across its interests, not least for communities, infrastructure and transport networks 
(see Cabinet Office, 2011b; 2011c; Department for Transport and CLG, 2010). Although the 
notion is becoming pervasive, definitional precision is rare bar notable exceptions regarding 
fire and flood risk that assert the necessity of embedding resilient construction in new 
developments (CLG, 2008; 2010). Beyond simplistic building specific guidance, ‘resilience’ 
remains an intangible aspiration and, significantly, there is no distinction between equilibrist 
and evolutionary understandings. Resilience is commonly viewed as a vague, singular whole. 
For instance, a supplement to Planning Policy Statement 1 concerning planning and climate 
change encourages planners to shape places ‘resilient’ to inevitable climatic change (CLG, 
2007a), but with no prescriptive advice given. The National Planning Policy Framework 
adopts a similar tone stating: ‘Planning plays a key role in helping shape places to secure 
radical reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, minimising vulnerability and providing 
resilience to the impacts of climate change’ (CLG, 2012: 22), but again no definition is 
provided.  
 
One notable issue is the link between planning’s long-standing role in engaging with wider 
actors and agencies and how resilience can be pursued by inclusive decision making practices. 
For example, Defra (2012: 250) suggests that: ‘Resilience in the built environment will depend 
on widely dispersed decision-making in the public and private sectors and, therefore, poses a 
particular capacity challenge, which potentially extends beyond the established levers of 
spatial planning, building regulation and industry best practice’. Yet this rare evolutionary 
appearing interpretation, emphasising flexibility, is similarly abstract and lacks guidance to aid 
practice. 
 Examining resilience in policy reveals that the political arena tends to take a more simplistic, 
monistic approach than academia, glossing over the nuances outlined in the previous section. 
Moreover, there is a notable lack of clarity to aid implementation and in cases where 
instructional guidance is given the onus is mainly on equilibrist resilience interpretations. 
Those policy arenas which have engaged with resilience have overwhelmingly focused on the 
less challenging engineering viewpoint, with the climate change field being the main exception 
perhaps due to its synergies with evolutionary resilience via the adaptation agenda and the 
notion of linking human and natural systems. Whilst it may understandable if infrastructure or 
emergency response orientated documents adopt an engineered construal, it is striking that this 
is a dominant understanding of resilience in policy. The presence of policy silos and decision 
making norms underlines this, with institutions seemingly more comfortable at engaging with 
endogenous, short-term risks.  
 
It should be noted that although academics have routinely identified resilience as a vague 
notion, when policy documents are analysed this is not precisely the case - equilibrist 
interpretations appear significantly less slippery than evolutionary ones. The analysis of how 
the concept is utilised reveals that resilience has been appropriated within planning policy in 
either atomised, equilibrist, engineering interpretations or imprecise evolutionary abstractions 
lacking instructive guidance. They are rarely discussed in unison as is common in academe. 
The former is more reactive, short-termist and ultimately achievable, whilst the latter has 
contrasting characteristics but may be more desirable from a risk management perspective. 
 
The practical realisation of resilience may not be the only aim of the policy however. 
Symbolically, the deployment of resilience discourses reformulates crises and uncertainty as 
not uncontrollable, but an opportunity to pro-actively confront threats and even to provide 
general betterment. Particularly in circumstances where individuals, communities and 
businesses can do little to be immunised from risk, resilience - embedded within a language of 
assurance and comfort - offers hope and confidence. Resilience is therefore opportunistically 
tailored to fill ‘policy windows’ yielded in the wake of crises (Kingdon, 1984) or in response 
to emerging perils. In this vein, the Green Paper ‘A Resilient Nation’ (Conservatives, 2010) 
vaguely indicated the need for strategies for increased resilience against numerous twenty-first 
century threats including violent extremism, cyber terrorism and energy security. Under certain 
manifestations, then, resilience is a strategy to help govern uncertainty, blunting prospective 
allegations of mismanagement or inaction frequently levelled at decision makers during times 
of flux.  
 
The policy transition toward flood resilience, for example, was predated by a series of 
accusations of managerial failure directed at central government, local authorities and land 
managers, as seemingly avoidable risks were not averted (White and Richards, 2007). The 
aspiration for resilience therefore appears part of a cogent political strategy to repackage threats 
as either rife with uncertainty or with a natural inevitability. For instance, recent policy 
documents state that the precise effects of climate change are unknown (CLG, 2007a) or that 
‘flooding cannot be wholly prevented’ (CLG, 2010: 1). Similarly, guidance promoting 
resilience produced after terrorist attacks describes how risk is omnipresent and unavoidable 
(Coaffee et al., 2009). This demonstrates a degree of expectation management for populations 
who expect protection by the state. Projects and policies to ‘secure’ resilience thus provide a 
response to complex threats that may have opaque, remote and uncontrollable drivers. 
Consequently the concept has evolved as a pragmatic tool to potentially deliver endogenous 
responses to exogenous risks (see for example White, 2008; Shaw and Theobald, 2011). 
Resilience strategies promise risks can be ameliorated and where shocks are experienced 
society can return to ‘normality’ with rapidity and efficiency. Beyond the maintenance of 
‘business as usual’, conditions for business that is better than usual (London First, 2003) may 
also be created. 
 
Ideologically, resilience has also become a valuable political strategy facilitating neoliberal 
shifts in the responsibilities for risk governance from the state toward the private sector and 
communities, not least given how the costs to manage risks are perceived to be increasing. A 
reduction or withdrawal of the resources necessary to manage uncertain and societal threats 
centrally is partly legitimised by parallel narratives of fatalistic complexity, geo-political 
impasse or even increasing personal ‘freedoms’ in the wake of a retreat of the state. For 
instance, in 2004 estimates placed the cost of flood risk management to increase from £100m 
per annum to between £460m and £2,500m by 2080 (Evans et al., 2004), presenting a 
significant burden on the public purse, creating conditions for wider stakeholders to assume 
responsibility and for the private sector to commodify flood resilience at a household level (see 
Bachelor, 2012; Edwards, 2009). Policy documents now advocate that: ‘Householders and 
businesses at flood risk should take the appropriate steps to better protect their properties 
through property level resistance and resilience measures’ (HM Government, 2011c: 26). 
Resilience discourses therefore enable risks to be reconfigured to be the remit of multiple 
stakeholders, including citizens themselves, who have increased access to data, information 
and private sector products – and most importantly, a heightened responsibility to construct 
their own ‘resilience’ strategies. 
 
Although a deficit of definitional precision may frustrate the realisation of resilience, ironically 
this nebulous character may prove appealing to policy makers who can promote a vague view 
of resilience in generic terms to multiple audiences. In reality, the use of resilience in policy 
may well be a ‘coping mechanism’, not so much for managing shocks as detailed in the 
literature, but rather as a strategy of governance to address pervasive feelings of inaction when 
decision makers are faced with uncertainty, anxiety and complexity. It can reassert authority 
and provide an association with the positive characteristics of the concept rather than influence 
practice. Table two enhances table one, linking the aims of equilibrist and evolutionary 
resilience with their differing policy foci. 
 
 
 
Equilibrist Resilience Evolutionary Resilience 
Aim 
Equilibrist 
Existing normality 
Preserve  
Stability  
Adaptive 
New normality  
Transform 
Flexibility 
Focus 
Endogenous  
Short-term 
Reactive 
Atomised 
Exogenous  
Medium to long-term 
Proactive 
Abstract 
 
Table two: the differing aims and foci of equilibrist and evolutionary resilience. 
 
The ‘fuzzy’ nature of resilience, defined as ‘characterizations lacking conceptual clarity and 
difficult to operationalize’ (Markusen, 2003: 702) may have facilitated an upload of the concept 
into the easy, strategic rhetoric of policy domains (Pendall et al., 2010), but it is as yet unclear 
what the outcomes may be when translated to the practical and place-orientated context of 
spatial planning. The conceptual anomalies concerning which resilience and why inevitably lay 
the foundation for interpretation problems. The following section explores these implications 
in more depth. 
Whose Resilience: From Rhetoric to Reality? 
The need for partnerships, collaboration and a shared interpretation is viewed as essential to 
achieving resilience (Cole and Marzell, 2010). However, given the term’s incoherency and the 
contrasting contexts within which the diverse cast of actors operate, there is no reified view of 
how different planning approaches may lead to alternative outcomes. The pursuance of 
resilience across policy areas and at the building, community, city, regional or national scale 
proclaims a degree of integrative logic, yet planning approaches will differ dependent upon 
which resilience is promoted. Equilibrist approaches demand a degree of vertical coherence 
across scales, whilst evolutionary interpretations are more horizontally integrated across 
sectors. Yet, if resilience is to be successful then clarity is needed over its intended 
interpretation and desired outcomes – or more simply resilience for whom? 
Techno-rational or Socio-cultural? 
‘Shocks’ are destabilising not just in terms of their immediate impacts on society and 
commerce, but because they expose the imperfections and frailties of ‘ways of life’ (Johnson, 
2002). These perils not only threaten to undermine the fluent operation of economic, social and 
infrastructural networks, but pose a broader threat to the state’s ability to govern, to protect 
people and to regulate the complex systems and interactions that compose the contemporary 
world. In response, authorities have identified resilience as an effort to generate governability, 
making the concept both a rhetorical device and mobilising concept to exert a degree of control 
over the seemingly ‘uncontrollable’; a way of managing knowledge deficits; or more simply a 
strategy to redress uncertainty.  
Analogously, the provision of certainty is presented as one of the fundamental aspirations of 
statutory planning systems, including transparent policy processes, clear procedures or set 
timescales for decisions (Tewdwr-Jones, 1999). Within planning the notion of resilience is 
identified as a method to manage unexpected shocks, being orientated towards either 
engineering dominated techno-rational functions or more evolutionary socio-cultural roles. The 
former can maintain or even increase certainty, where a focus on engineering or design enabled 
recovery can easily merge with existing procedures, but these may be reactive and short-
termist. Counter-intuitively, the latter may amplify insecurity as current institutions, processes 
and guidelines may be subject to change and even challenge the ability of planning to provide 
much needed certainty. Indeed, Gleeson (2008: 2658) argues that resilient urbanism: ‘should 
relinquish any belief in - certainly any aestheticised desire for - a stabilised, end-state urban 
system….The living must accept the inevitability of evolution, the necessity of adaptation, and 
embrace the hope of resilience’. 
When considering how resilience is manifest in planning policy, divergent interpretations are 
critical, as the certainty central to the nature of planning appears to resist more abstract 
evolutionary approaches but comfortably embrace equilibrist engineering solutions. This is 
reinforced by how planning has mainly seconded resilience within a techno-rational frame, and 
its related hazard management and emergency response fields. Both the risk-based approach 
and the common disaster cycle of response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness help to cast 
planning as procedural and reactive, which may not be effective at breaking the ‘cycle’ and 
could even be maladaptive (Barnett and O’Neill, 2010). This facilitates the domination of 
engineering agendas overemphasising responses to peril, and relegating efforts to reduce their 
socio-cultural drivers. In other words, risk is not averted and instead contingency and recovery 
plans are developed. This view links with a techno-rational form of planning which is familiar 
and comfortable for policy makers. Moreover, the reliance on long-held quantitative modelling 
and evidence-based approaches in spatial planning also predisposes engineered outcomes. 
These approaches work well within closed, static systems but may be difficult to apply within 
more complex social-cultural systems that effectively render ‘equilibrium’ an impossibility.  
The techno-rational response to threats also emphasises the role of the expert and promotes 
strategies which may be unpalatable to the public. For example, would citizens argue for the 
commodification of flood resilience now promoted throughout Europe (White, 2010) or do 
they simply want state protection? Though presented as pro-active and empowering (CLG, 
2011a), the selective emphasising of engineered characteristics of resilience, such as rebound, 
can therefore be used to pursue regressive policy outcomes leaving vulnerable citizens and 
communities exposed to risk.  
Evolutionary resilience is discussed on a broad, socio-cultural basis predicated on seemingly 
powerful strategic shifts, for instance through efforts to link the natural world with built 
environments such as those promoted by the climate change adaptation agenda (Shaw et al., 
2007). Transformability is key to operationalising this approach but this may challenge 
institutions - both with regard to their power to enact change and desire for any reform of the 
current modus operandi. Therefore, this understanding may struggle to be realised, as resilience 
in planning is inclined towards engineering understandings; maintaining normality with 
activity focused at the building scale, leaving much existing governance and practice 
uncontested. It is questionable whether spatial planning possesses the ability to influence 
existing power arrangements and institutions, or more specifically the conditions underpinning 
the current normality, or whether it essentially promotes ‘pop up’ recovery (Pike et al., 2010).  
Although promoted as a key transformative agenda resilience therefore may be relatively 
powerless; unable to influence socio-cultural agendas and instead confined to the hinterland of 
regulatory planning through design guidance or building codes. Whilst undoubtedly important, 
these strategies focus on the time and degree to which a pre-shock normality is resumed through 
predominantly reactionary closed system approaches acknowledging neither trajectories of 
change nor the need for regime adjustment in response to threshold exceedance. In other words, 
the desirable political imperative to appear to pursue evolutionary resilience, may conflict with 
existing governance tools that underpin techno-rational rather than socio-cultural approaches, 
significantly diluting the impact of a potentially powerful agenda.  
Resilient Buildings or Resilient Societies? 
Interpretations of the concept also touch upon issues of scale: techno-rational viewpoints 
promote resilient buildings; resilient societies are more analogous with socio-cultural policies. 
On a smaller spatial scale, securing resilience often includes engineering alterations to 
proposals, such as the materials used or building design. Whilst equilibrist views of resilience 
are reasonable policy outcomes they may perpetuate communities as passive receptacles of 
risk; ‘protected’ but potentially locked in a cycle of detriment and recovery in a similar vein to 
the ‘safe development paradox’ (Burby, 2006) or the ‘escalator effect’ (Parker, 1995) within 
floodplain management. Critically, this understanding divorces drivers from outcomes, 
prioritising elasticity and an efficient rebound from shocks. A focus on returning to a fixed 
equilibrium may be resilient in the short term but have the opposite effect over a longer time 
period, embedding risk spatially.  
 
However, not only may strategic objectives such as resilient cities, economies or even nations 
challenge practice, but change at larger spatial scales may have unintended consequences at 
local levels. For example, evolutionary notions of resilience do not just acknowledge 
multifaceted interconnections, but advocate a re-evaluation of existing decision making 
processes and priorities for space. Although appreciating the effects of resilience over wider 
scales and sectors is challenging it is critical for understanding the ‘interplay between 
persistence and change, adaptability and transformability. Without the scale definition, 
resilience and transformation may be in conflict’ (Folke et al., 2010: 6).  
 
Like risk (Beck, 1992), resilience is a political, cultural and social construction. The concept 
has therefore become open to expert reconstruction generating further challenges for risk 
governance. Those staking a claim in the concept of resilience experience tensions as 
stakeholders pull it in potentially conflicting ways. Inevitably, therefore, resilience within 
planning will have to engage with power as it concerns choices regarding the negotiation of 
space and the creation of place. For example, whilst the article has already highlighted the 
problems of a simple return to equilibrium, there are further operational issues such as what 
any equilibrium should be and for what purpose? Economic or social resilience outcomes may 
compete and if a sub-optimal equilibrium is pursued it may even make places less resilient as 
methods to respond to an immediate threat may impinge efforts to achieve long-term 
adaptability. Furthermore, simply returning to a previous position may benefit one sector of an 
economy at the expense of another, with exposure consequentially amplified or with impacts 
displaced.  
 
Practical efforts to achieve resilience are frequently facilitated by an emphasis on best practice. 
With regard to spatial planning and resilience this is focused on the building scale and may 
include, for example, buildings able to resist fire (CLG 2008), terror attacks (see 
www.nactso.gov.uk) or to recover quickly from flooding (CLG, 2007b). This design and 
engineering-led view of resilience is relatively transferable between locations. As the spatial 
scale increases, it is, however, difficult to maintain this simple approach and notions of resilient 
cities emphasise the need to address drivers and work in an interdisciplinary manner (Otto-
Zimmermann, 2011), which given the variable geographies, institutions and resources of urban 
areas may be a strategy that is difficult to reconcile with reductionist measures. Chritopherson 
et al. (2010: 9) emphasise this point, stating: ‘we should avoid assuming that the same drivers 
of change are at work everywhere and if we just pull the right levers, the appropriate drivers 
will respond and deliver the required outcomes’. 
 
Yet, given recent trends in planning it may be inevitable that there will be efforts to codify 
resilience through a series of homogenised exemplars which may not reflect spatial 
differentiations. Indeed equilibrist, engineered approaches may be ‘ill-equipped to explain the 
geographical diversity, variety and unevenness of the resilience of places’ (Pike et al., 2010: 
61), whilst evolutionary notions of resilience are more dislocated from space and place and 
resist exemplification. Where this is attempted, the promotion of best practice may leave 
‘development dialogue trapped in the abstract, where reports create false expectations, and 
where regions may be led towards ill-suited programme interventions’ (Bristow, 2010: 161). 
Beyond discrete individual proposals the concept may be unhelpfully heterogeneous, relating 
to processes, networks or broader driving forces operating across sectors at multiple scales. 
Therefore, resilience may be politically packaged as ‘placeless’ but resist the application of a 
one-size-fits-all spatial straightjacket, inhibiting transferability. 
 
Table three develops the theme utilised in this article by linking the differing interpretations of 
resilience with their divergent planning approaches. Analysing the policy landscape, it is clear 
that resilience initiatives can lead to distinct outcomes, underlining the need to be clear about 
which resilience is relevant and why it is desirable. Equilibrist approaches are techno-rational, 
have synergies with vertically integrated approaches and mainly resonate with a homogenised 
focus. They can be effective at the building scale via the development management system, 
and whilst do not challenge existing governance or practice, may fit very well within existing 
planning frameworks. Evolutionary resilience outlooks are more tuned to socio-cultural 
conditions, advocating horizontal integration across sectors. Their multiple equilibria approach 
links well with forward planning and strategic city-scale or societal dimensions, but their 
heterogeneity means it may be difficult to translate into practical outcomes. 
 
 
 
Equilibrist Resilience Evolutionary Resilience 
Aim 
Equilibrist 
Existing normality 
Preserve  
Stability  
Adaptive 
New normality  
Transform  
Flexibility 
Focus 
Endogenous  
Short-term 
Reactive 
Atomised 
Exogenous  
Medium to long-term 
Proactive 
Abstract 
Planning 
Approaches 
Techno-rational  
Vertical integration 
Building focus 
Homogeneity 
Socio-cultural  
Horizontal integration 
Societal focus 
Heterogeneity 
 
Table three: how the aims and foci of equilibrist and evolutionary resilience demand differing 
planning approaches. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The influence of resilience spans the interests of spatial planning, from communities to 
infrastructure to built environment sustainability more generally. Resilience has consequently 
become ‘naturalised’ (see Jessop, 2005) - no longer considered a conceptual tourist in the 
vocabulary of spatial planning, but accepted and recognised as a key notion to address the 
uneven ability of places to respond to change.  
 
The issues highlighted in this paper help demonstrate how problematic it is to transfer a concept 
developed in the natural sciences to the logics of the social sciences, which can map onto broad 
disciplinary understandings but face difficulties in translation. This legacy still resonates, as in 
an effort to demonstrate the concept’s relevance and to provide a tangible illustration of its 
potential practical utility, a range of ecological terminologies, such as sensitivity, thresholds 
and adaptability may be utilised (Homer-Dixon, 2000) and consequently reinterpreted within 
disciplinary contexts. Political organizers frequently utilise umbrella concepts designed to 
draw strange bedfellows together (Markusen, 2003), yet the easy ability of resilience to 
influence a host of distinct subject areas is not necessarily useful in practice to the extent that 
there is a viable view that for some resilience should be ‘thrown out in favour of concepts that 
are more meaningful within disciplinary contexts’ (Chritopherson et al., 2010: 4). 
 
Indeed, the very pliability of the term threatens to undermine its utility and longevity: 
interpretations of the concept can be seen to be both certain and flexible; preservationist and 
transformist; reactive and proactive; and homogeneous and heterogeneous. Though these 
protean qualities can prove valuable at engaging seemingly disparate disciplines, places and 
spaces, this paper argues that without clarity over conceptual framing in practice resilience will 
mainly be delivered in its most simple and unchallenging equilibrist, engineered understanding.  
 Although seductive to policy-makers, resilience has been revealed as inherently ambiguous for 
practitioners, reinforcing its manifestation as essentially ‘restless’ (Gleeson, 2008). 
Notwithstanding this conceptual fuzziness, or perhaps, because of it, resilience has been 
commissioned to support a raft of subsidiary initiatives. It has become a ‘useful but unspecified 
metaphor among policymakers in the context of uncertain and disruptive change’ (Pike et al., 
2010: 61), transcending administrative, national and geographical boundaries, and 
interchangeable between actors, interests and institutions. This rapid emergence may better 
reflect the term’s rhetorical rather than practical utility. The wide range of contemporary risks 
threatens not just the ability of states to demonstrate control and governability, but of markets 
to operate, for capital to be efficiently accumulated and for societies to lend legitimacy to these 
ensembles. Significantly therefore, resilience may be described as a mechanism better able to 
promote political confidence than practical change, resonating strongly with the social 
constructivist global ‘securitization’ discourses, which are becoming prevalent at national 
scales (Aradau, 2009). 
 
Although the concept may appear a neutral, progressive antidote to uncertainty or, like 
sustainability, a platonic idea of the ‘good’ (Neuman, 2005), the concept should be approached 
with caution, as whilst theoretically it has potential to depoliticise the dynamics of change 
(Wilkinson, 2011) in the harsh competition of practice it will bring both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
Yet there is little recognition of how power dynamics have underwritten its trajectory (Hudson, 
2010) and subsequent application. As demonstrated in the previous sections, resilience has a 
clear ideological if not yet practical power; yet conversely, a key allure of the concept is that it 
appears the opposite: eminently practical and not at all ideological.  
 
The multiple understandings of the ontological and epistemological framing of resilience lay 
the foundation for differing outcomes. Policy analysis revealed that there is an overwhelming 
tendency to interpret resilience as an ‘engineered’ response, where risk is countered in an 
equilibrist, atomised manner with the definitional concerns and socio-cultural aspects mostly 
unacknowledged. Further, although planning is well placed to pursue the opportunities that 
disturbance offers and facilitate the collaboration necessary for more evolutionary approaches 
it is constrained by innate orderly pressures that resist ‘novelty’ (Davoudi 2012b). Even where 
more ‘adaptive’ language is used it may also be enveloped within an engineered understanding, 
as may be seen with how the disaster cycle has been engaged with from a narrow emergency 
response view. It appears that equilibrist resilience has prevailed as it describes a reality more 
analogous with planning norms, engineered responses, dominant interests and techno-
managerialism trends. 
 
Relationships between cities and their inhabitants are changing. Hodson and Marvin (2010: 2) 
argue that this is ‘not a phenomenon that is happening naturally but is the product of specific 
social, economic, political and spatial processes, and that these changes have profound 
implications for the mutual organisation of cities and infrastructure and consequently for the 
shape of future urbanism’. Yet, much of the discussion of resilience in policy and practice has 
an air of inevitability that fails to acknowledge this interconnectivity, essentially becoming an 
engineered response to the way the world is. Here, the wider processes that both drive risk and 
enable adaptive change take on an aspirational air that does not mesh well with the realities of 
spatial planning practice.  
 
Resilience has been revealed to be post-political to the extent that it is framed as an inevitable 
outcome of capitalism and its associated social and economic paradigms (Swyngedouw, 2009). 
Alternative evolutionary approaches are tangential to the policy discussion with outcomes 
instead focused on consensus and technocratic management. Whilst conceptually presented as 
a possible paradigm shift, resilience policy may serve to underpin existing practices; 
consensually accepted into the post-political mainstream with its logical narratives of 
inevitability and recovery avoiding difficult questions concerning the impacts of capitalism 
more generally (Klein, 2007) or neoliberal growth agendas central to contemporary spatial 
planning (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2011).  
 
The pursuit of equilibrist resilience can therefore be seen as deterministically counter-
productive, resisting adaptive transformation by suggesting circumstances are inevitable and 
even reinforcing neoliberal discourses of capitalism that have a tendency to naturalise crises 
(Evans, 2011). An alternative socio-cultural view, for example, could involve challenging the 
aspects of capitalism that separate nature from the built environment, exacerbating climatic 
change and eroding natural capital in cities (Hough, 2006). However, this more radical 
evolutionary agenda has not yet translated from academia to practice. Embracing risk in a 
techno-rational manner fails to recognise the critical importance of the underlying structures of 
neo-liberalism and global capitalism that drive contemporary urbanism (Hodson and Marvin, 
2010) underpinning instability and perpetuating the risks to people and places. As Neocleous 
(2013: 5) explains: “Neoliberal citizenship is nothing if not a training in resilience as the new 
technology of the self: a training to withstand whatever crisis capital undergoes and whatever 
political measures the state carries out to save it.”  
 
Whilst in some ways this reductionism is a function of applied practice within the complexity 
of urbanology, it is also a form of ‘crypto positivism that is strongly suggestive of a naturalised 
human society’ (Gleeson 2012: 938), with the seemingly expansive resilience narratives 
described at the start of the paper leading down ever narrowly prescribed spatial pathways as 
outcomes draw near. This may be a product of how resilience is framed as such a powerful 
rational logic by the political class, the naturalistic strains of which reinforce the urban 
determinism so prevalent in modernity that privileges spatial forms over spatial processes 
(Gleeson 2012; Harvey 1997). 
 
Whilst resilience offers a case for community empowerment, the nature of threats and the 
inability of citizens to address them appears to privilege expert, technical knowledge. However, 
resilience is promoted as essentially inclusionary - even empowering – with an added ability 
to stimulate the private sector in countering vulnerability. Techno-rational narratives applied 
to individuals argue against the collectivisation of risk, undermining principles of welfare 
universalism and promoting the individualisation of managerial strategies. This market-
orientated responsibilisation transforms people from subjects to active citizens and 
‘consumers’, neatly mapping onto self-reliance dimensions of resilience (see Cole and Mazell, 
2010). Critically, however, such interpretations depend upon well-informed citizens and the 
affordable provision of insurance or technology. Therefore neoliberal promotions of personal 
resilience may be socially regressive given how financial limitations or a lack of capacity will 
preclude the engagement of many.  
 
There is a perception in policy of resilience as a uniformly positive force, but the findings from 
this research suggest that this may not carry through to practice, with some intervention 
strategies and sections of society privileged over others. This approach also creates a resilience 
paradox whereby threats are normalised and reacted to – essentially a product of attempting to 
apply the ‘laws’ of a naturalistic approach to a subject with an inherent unknowability. The 
dual meaning discussed in this article is also at the heart of this paradox – what it may promises 
to alleviate in political rhetoric it propagates in practice – simultaneously managing the impacts 
of risks and failing to grapple with those structures that embed it.  
 
Although some posit that the concept of resilience is becoming a ‘pervasive idiom of global 
governance’ (Walker and Cooper, 2011: 144) this paper argues that its influence on spatial 
planning is rather more muted given the disconnect of more evolutionary notions from the 
practical outcomes so central to this sphere. We have discussed how there are contrasting 
interpretations of resilience, and critically that they each have their own drivers, planning 
approaches and outcomes. We also highlight that the rapid acceptance of resilience has been 
facilitated by its innate ideological synergy with dominant post-political and neoliberal 
governance trends centred on complexity, responsibilisation and economics.  
 
In much the same way that Sustainable Development similarly captured the zeitgeist of the late 
20th century; resilience may be the perfect symbol of its time: a conveniently nebulous concept 
incorporating shifting notions of risk and responsibility bounded within a reconstituted 
governance framework – all of which can engender confidence and potentially facilitate the 
transfer of costs away from the state to the private sector and communities. As the agenda 
moves from rhetoric to reality however, if the very same fuzzy qualities which aided its rise 
remain unaddressed they may serve to undermine the effect of a promising notion to manage 
change in an uncertain world. 
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